Russian Information Influence Targeting Armenia. Analysis of FIMI Narratives and Mechanisms for September 2026
An analitical commentary
This analysis was prepared as part of the analytical work carried out within the Armenia Counter-FIMI Hub 2026, an operational and analytical initiative aimed at strengthening Armenia’s capacity to identify, document and analyse foreigninformation manipulation and interference (FIMI).
September monitoring of Russian information influence targeting Armenia indicates a further development of the mechanisms observed in August, but also a significant qualitative shift in messaging. Whereas earlier narratives were dominated by an emphasis on the costs of Yerevan’s strategic distancing from Moscow, in September parts of the Russian information ecosystem began to portray this process as already resulting in a loss of sovereignty and the gradual subordination of Armenia to the interests of the West, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. The analysed material repeatedly linked issues concerning Armenia’s relations with the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the United States, the future of the Russian military presence, reform of the security system, the TRIPP project, relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as internal conflicts surrounding the Armenian Apostolic Church and the government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. This does not mean that all of these narratives constituted elements of a single centrally coordinated operation. The monitoring does, however, show a high degree of recurrence in the interpretative frames employed, as well as their mutual reinforcement across Russian state media, commentary channels, and parts of the local information environment.
The dominant mechanism remained the narrowing of Armenia’s perceived range of safe strategic choices. Alternatives to the country’s existing relations with Russia were portrayed as more costly, less predictable, and potentially dangerous in economic, military, political, and identity-related terms. Such messaging reinforced the perception that reducing dependence on Moscow could entail greater costs than maintaining the existing ties. A critical attitude towards Russia therefore did not preclude acceptance of the continued maintenance of certain relations with it, where the alternatives were perceived as more risky.
Dynamics of messaging in September:
From warnings about costs to the narrative of Armenia’s “Takeover”
Analysis of the material from the entire month shows a clear evolution of the dominant interpretative frames. Their recurrence and gradual expansion are evident. Initially, the emphasis was placed on the costs of Armenia’s strategic distancing from Russia, followed by the risks associated with Western alternatives, while towards the end of the month the messaging increasingly suggested a loss of sovereignty and the external subordination of the state.
Between 1 and 3 September, the dominant frame was that of a strategic choice between Armenia’s existing ties with Russia and rapprochement with the West. The main points of reference were Armenia’s relations with the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, the economic benefits of cooperation with Russia, and the anticipated costs of changing its orientation. At the same time, the discussion concerning Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri was shifted from the question of its utility towards the consequences of its potential withdrawal. A reduction of the Russian presence was portrayed as the loss of the “last shield” of security, while Armenia was depicted as a state that the West could use against Russia.
Between 4 and 9 September, this construct was expanded to include the issue of European visa liberalisation, the TRIPP project, and changes portrayed as manifestations of the Westernisation of the state. Local reports concerning potential conditions for visa liberalisation were developed into a narrative of “visa blackmail”. TRIPP was presented as a project capable of altering the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus and creating space for US military or intelligence infrastructure. Even changes to the regulations governing military salutes were used as a signal of the progressive adaptation of the Armenian armed forces to NATO standards.
Between 10 and 13 September, Turkey was more strongly emphasised as a potential beneficiary of the weakening of Russia’s position in Armenia. Western involvement began to be portrayed as a process that could draw Armenia into Turkey’s strategic orbit. At the same time, Russia’s educational, linguistic, and cultural presence, including the activities of the Russian Houses, was promoted. On 12 September, the economic argument again became particularly prominent: Russian gas was presented as a tangible benefit whose loss could directly affect Armenia’s economic situation. Attempts to simultaneously maintain relations with the Eurasian system while pursuing political rapprochement with Europe were, in turn, portrayed as an inconsistent or opportunistic policy.
Between 14 and 16 September, the messaging expanded from military security to energy and cultural issues. Diversification, modernisation, green transition, and regional integration were portrayed as processes that could lead to a loss of control over strategic sectors. At the same time, Russia’s economic resilience was emphasised and messaging concerning the durability of Russia’s linguistic and educational presence was further developed. On 15 September, a more radical frame emerged, portraying Armenia as a state “betraying itself”. A day later, the simultaneous use of the themes of Russian gas, the 102nd Military Base, and border delimitation with Azerbaijan made it possible to combine the economy, military security, and territory into a single image of growing risk.
Between 17 and 21 September, particular importance was attached to TRIPP, the future of Armenia’s borders, the issue of prisoners held by Azerbaijan, and US support for reforms of the armed forces. On 19 September, the announcement of US support for the Armenian military was juxtaposed with examples from Afghanistan, Iraq, Georgia, and Ukraine, which were presented as warnings about the consequences of Western military assistance. On the same day, the narrative concerning the impossibility of safely withdrawing the Russian base re-emerged. On 20 September, an opposition assessment concerning the “dismantling of the foundations of statehood” was incorporated into a broader image of Armenia’s degradation, while a day later TRIPP was already being portrayed as a mechanism that could lead to the loss of control over strategic routes.
Between 22 and 24 September, official Russian institutional sources played a greater role. Integration with the European Union was portrayed as a risky “adventure”, the value of European support was questioned, and growing US involvement in reforming the security system was described as a costly and uncertain alternative. Russian security institutions warned against replacing existing Russian guarantees with American solutions. At the same time, the language concerning TRIPP underwent further radicalisation. Alongside the category of threat, the frame of “colonisation” also appeared.
Between 25 and 27 September, Russian interpretative frames were increasingly legitimised through references to local actors, opposition statements, commentators, and opinion polls. Data concerning support for the continued presence of the Russian military base, information about US funding of Armenian media, and the claim that “nobody in Europe is waiting for Armenia” were highlighted. In this way, Russian frames also appeared within the local information environment and could be perceived as positions formulated from within the Armenian debate, irrespective of the nature of individual actors’ ties to Russian sources.
The most radical forms of messaging appeared in the final days of the month. Between 28 and 30 September, narratives concerning the persecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Turkish economic expansion through TRIPP, and the takeover of Armenia by Western and Turkish structures intensified. In some materials, the suggestion of a future threat was replaced by the assertion that the process of subordination had already taken place and that restoring Russian influence was necessary. At the same time, Rosatom’s offer concerning the future of Armenia’s nuclear energy sector was widely highlighted. This made it possible to juxtapose the threat narrative with a positive offer: Russia was portrayed not only as an actor warning about the consequences of a change in orientation, but also as a provider of technologies and resources that would be difficult to replace. On 30 September, the narrative concerning an alleged Western demand to introduce visas for Russian citizens also reappeared.
Across the month as a whole, a shift in emphasis is therefore visible. At the beginning of September, the dominant question concerned the cost of reducing dependence on Russia. In the following weeks, Western alternatives were increasingly portrayed as a source of new threats to the economy, security, and sovereignty. By the end of the month, some of the messaging went a step further: it no longer warned about a possible loss of control, but presented it as a process already underway. It is precisely this transition from warning about consequences to describing an alleged “takeover” of Armenia that constitutes the most noticeable qualitative change in the September material.
Source laundering and changes in the status of information:
The visa narrative case
One of the clearest cases of information manipulation observed in September concerned the narrative surrounding visa liberalisation and the alleged requirement to restrict the movement of Russian citizens. Its significance lies primarily in the way the status of the information changed at successive stages of circulation. The starting point was a local report concerning possible conditions linked to the visa liberalisation process. The information was uncertain in nature and required further confirmation. In subsequent reproductions, however, it was taken up by successive channels, while caveats concerning its source and reliability gradually disappeared. A possibility or hypothesis began to be presented as the position of the European Union, and subsequently as a demand to restrict the entry of Russian citizens into Armenia. At a later stage, the message acquired a political interpretation. A condition whose status remained uncertain was incorporated into a broader narrative of “visa blackmail” and presented as evidence that European integration requires Armenia to restrict its relations with Russia. Administrative information was therefore transformed into an argument concerning the geopolitical price of rapprochement with the European Union.
This case demonstrates a mechanism relevant from a FIMI perspective. Repeated amplification increased the reach of the message while simultaneously changing its status. As the information circulated, references to the uncertainty of the source disappeared, while the categorical nature of the claim increased. Ultimately, the recipient could encounter a message functioning as an established fact, even though its original basis was considerably weaker. The significance of this case lies in the possibility of tracing the full sequence through which the information was transformed, from an uncertain report, through successive stages of amplification, to a categorical claim circulating as fact. The visa narrative therefore constitutes one of the best-documented examples in the September material of a FIMI mechanism based on changing the status of information in the course of its distribution.
Sources, channels, and mechanisms of amplification of russian messaging
September monitoring shows that Russian messaging targeting Armenia operates across several overlapping information circuits. These include direct communication by Russian institutions and state media, Russian-language commentary and social media channels, as well as local Armenian media and channels reproducing or adapting Russian interpretative frames. The significance of this arrangement lies in the ability of different sources to cite, adapt, and reinforce similar messages, even in the absence of a single hierarchical structure.
The most direct presence of the Russian media apparatus in the Armenian market is provided by Sputnik Armenia, which operates within the structure of MIA Rossiya Segodnya and publishes in parallel in Russian and Armenian. This enables Russian interpretative frames to be transferred directly into both linguistic segments of the Armenian information environment. Sputnik is also part of the broader system of Russian state media, in which RIA Novosti, TASS, RT, and other sources provide statements, quotations, recordings, and news-agency material that are subsequently translated, summarised, or adapted by other channels within the information circulation. Research on the Armenian media market has also indicated that local media frequently reproduce material from RIA Novosti, TASS, and Interfax. Within the corpus analysed, Sputnik was among the most frequently used Russian sources. This conclusion applies exclusively to the material covered by the monitoring and does not describe the Armenian media market as a whole.
Another significant source of messaging is official Russian institutions: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the state administration and security apparatus, diplomatic missions, and institutions responsible for Russia’s external presence. Their statements provide material with a high institutional status, which can subsequently be developed by media outlets and commentators. In September, a recurring mechanism was observed in which a relatively cautious institutional statement concerning the risks or costs associated with a particular Armenian decision was subsequently amplified by commentary predicting much more far-reaching consequences.
The strongest radicalisation of language generally occurred in Russian-language commentary, commentator channels, and social media. It was in this segment that expressions referring to “betrayal”, “colonisation”, an “Armenian Zelensky”, subordination to the West, or the need to restore Armenia to the Russian sphere of influence appeared. This created a relationship in which an official warning about the costs of European integration could be transformed into a much more radical prediction of loss of sovereignty or state collapse.
Another element of the information circulation consists of Armenian-language portals and local commentators reproducing Russian narrative frames. Their significance lies primarily in the localisation of the message. A narrative previously formulated within the Russian information environment may reappear as a statement by an Armenian politician, expert, economist, military figure, Church representative, or local journalist. From the recipient’s perspective, it then ceases to function solely as an external message from Moscow and begins to participate in Armenia’s internal political debate. However, the mere consistency of a message with a Russian interpretative frame does not constitute evidence of an operational link between a local actor and the Russian state. It is important to distinguish between controlled Russian media and institutions, entities with identified links to the Russian influence ecosystem, and local sources that may independently reproduce particular narratives for political, ideological, or commercial reasons. From the perspective of monitoring, the key factors remain the amplification effect and the consistency of dominant frames, without automatically attributing common tasking to all participants in the information circulation. These observations are supplemented by the findings of external research on the Armenian media environment conducted in 2026. That research identified a group of local portals displaying a high degree of content synchronisation and a consistently pro-Russian editorial line. Analysis of infrastructure, cross-citation patterns, and semantic similarity indicated that this segment remains an important channel for reproducing Russian messaging, although its penetration into the mainstream Armenian media environment was more limited.
A particular function is performed by Russian- and Armenian-language Telegram channels, which enable content to move rapidly between different parts of the ecosystem. A quotation from a political statement may be removed from its broader context, accompanied by commentary, graphics, or video material, and then taken up by subsequent channels and portals. In this way, Telegram shortens the path between the original message and its more emotional or radical interpretation. Findings concerning networks of pro-Russian channels and automated activity come from external research and are not the result of monitoring conducted within the framework of the project.
Alongside political media, there are also aggregators and general news services, where material concerning Russia, NATO, Pashinyan, or TRIPP appears alongside economic, social, sports, and cultural news. This is significant for the way in which messaging is distributed: a political narrative reaches the recipient as part of an ordinary stream of news, rather than exclusively through a channel openly positioning itself within a geopolitical dispute.
A separate category is Russian infrastructure for social and cultural presence: Russian Houses, Rossotrudnichestvo projects, university cooperation, promotion of the Russian language, youth programmes, and historical and cultural initiatives. These activities should not automatically be classified as FIMI. They do, however, create a durable environment of contacts and Russian presence that operates in parallel with media influence. In September, this was particularly visible in the juxtaposition of two types of communication. Part of the messaging emphasised the risks associated with Armenia’s distancing from Moscow, while at the same time promoting Russian educational, linguistic, and cultural projects as elements of lasting and beneficial relations between the two societies.
In broader terms, the most important feature of the information system described above is the possibility of repeated circulation of the same interpretative frame between different categories of sources. A message may originate from a Russian institution, be developed by a state media outlet or commentator, pass through Telegram, be adapted by a local portal or Armenian actor, and then reappear in the Russian information environment as a “voice from Armenia”. Not every such flow indicates coordination. Its effect, however, may be to obscure the original source of the narrative and create the impression that a similar interpretation of events is emerging independently across many different sources.
The cost of strategic autonomy as the main persuasive frame
One of the most consistent frames in Russian messaging remained the portrayal of Armenia’s strategic efforts to reduce its dependence on Moscow as a process carrying high and immediate costs. The importance of the Russian market, preferential energy terms, and the economic benefits associated with Armenia’s participation in the Eurasian Economic Union were emphasised. European integration was contrasted with this as a direction that could entail more expensive energy, more difficult market access, and problems related to exports, transport, and investment. This mechanism relies primarily on loss aversion. The potential benefits of diversification are presented as distant, conditional, and uncertain, while the costs of reducing existing ties with Russia are portrayed as concrete and capable of being felt immediately. As a result, the focus of the debate shifts from the question of the long-term benefits of greater autonomy to the question of what Armenia may lose in the short term. Within this construct, the Russian market, gas, and infrastructure become not only elements of the existing dependency, but also arguments against attempts to reduce it.
Russian military presence as a condition of security
In the security sphere, one of the most important elements of Russian messaging remained the 102nd Military Base in Gyumri. The presence of the Russian base was presented as a fundamental guarantee of Armenia’s security, the loss of which would create a dangerous strategic vacuum. The messaging shifted the debate from assessing the effectiveness of the Russian military presence to the consequences of its possible termination. The base was described as the “last shield”, while the possibility of withdrawing Russian troops was linked to increased pressure from Turkey and Azerbaijan. In its most simplified form, the message reduced Armenia’s strategic choice to the assumption that limiting Russia’s presence would mean creating greater space for Turkish influence.
Towards the end of the month, this frame was reinforced by highlighting polling results indicating support among part of the population for the continued stationing of Russian troops. The focus of the debate was shifted towards the risks associated with the loss of existing security guarantees. As in the economic messaging, the existing dependency was thus presented as an argument against reducing it.
The West as an actor using Armenia against Russia
At the same time, messaging was developed that sought to undermine the credibility of Armenia’s Western partners. The United States and European countries were portrayed as actors exploiting Armenia’s geographic position and its changing geopolitical orientation in order to constrain Russian influence.
Already at the beginning of the month, Armenia appeared in Russian messaging as a potential “battering ram” against Russia or as a tool in the hands of external actors. References to Georgia and Ukraine served to construct the image of a recurring scenario. This scenario consisted of a post-Soviet state drawing closer to the West, expanding political and military cooperation, experiencing a deterioration in relations with Moscow, and subsequently entering into conflict, with the state itself bearing the principal costs. Armenia was thus placed within a pattern previously applied by Russian propaganda to other countries in the region.
By the middle of the month, this frame had been further adapted to the Armenian context through stronger use of the Turkish threat. The West was portrayed both as treating Armenia instrumentally in its rivalry with Russia and as creating space for Ankara’s growing influence. In this messaging, NATO ceased to function as an abstract structure associated primarily with Washington or Brussels and began to be presented through the prism of Turkey, a state far more deeply embedded in Armenian historical memory and threat perceptions. This made it possible to give the broader narrative of Western subordination a much more local and emotional character.
NATO and the United States as an illusory alternative
In Russian messaging, Armenia’s cooperation with the United States and NATO was portrayed as a process leading to the gradual dependence of the country’s security system on Western structures. A characteristic mechanism involved attributing strategic significance to technical and procedural changes. The discussion concerning the manner of rendering military honours was presented as evidence of the Armenian armed forces’ transition to Western standards and as another stage in their “NATO-isation”. In this way, a limited regulatory change was transformed into evidence of a broader geopolitical process and a gradual loss of autonomy in the defence sphere.
Towards the end of the month, this frame was reinforced by information concerning US funding of military programmes and support for reforms of the Armenian armed forces. Russian institutional and commentary sources portrayed Western involvement as costly, protracted, and lacking any guarantee of effectiveness. Military cooperation with the United States and NATO was consequently positioned as a risky attempt to replace existing Russian guarantees with a system presented as less certain and more dependent on external conditions.
Ukraine as a warning scenario
Ukraine was used in Russian messaging as a warning of the possible consequences of Armenia’s geopolitical reorientation. Rapprochement with the West, the reduction of ties with Russia, and the development of cooperation with Western security structures were presented as successive stages of a process that could lead to confrontation with Moscow. The messaging did not demonstrate that the situations of Armenia and Ukraine were comparable; rather, Ukraine served primarily as a negative reference scenario for decisions taken by Yerevan.
Towards the end of September, this pattern was applied directly to Nikol Pashinyan, whom Russian commentators began to describe as the “Armenian Zelensky”. The term made it possible to condense into a single phrase a broader set of associations already present in Russian messaging: a leader subordinated to the West, deepening conflict with Russia, and leading his own state towards confrontation. The personalisation of the narrative thus reinforced the earlier message according to which Armenia’s strategic distancing from Moscow could lead to a repetition of the scenario portrayed by Russian propaganda as the “Ukrainian” one.
Turkey and Azerbaijan as local sources of threat
An important element of Russian messaging involved embedding broader geopolitical narratives in concerns related to Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russia was portrayed as a barrier limiting the further expansion of Ankara’s and Baku’s influence, while a weakening of the Russian presence was presented as a factor increasing Armenia’s vulnerability to pressure from its regional neighbours.
In the second half of the month, more radical messages concerning Turkish expansion began to appear, including portrayals of Armenian territory as an element necessary to achieve the geographical completion of the “Turkic world”. This made it possible to link current disputes over infrastructure, security, and regional relations with the historically entrenched perception of threat associated with Turkey.
At the same time, the credibility of the peace process with Azerbaijan was challenged. Negotiations were portrayed as a sequence of unilateral Armenian concessions in which each compromise increased the scope for further pressure from Baku. In the most simplified version of the message, peace was equated with capitulation, and capitulation with further territorial and political losses. Such a frame shifted the interpretation of the peace process away from the category of reducing the risk of conflict and towards the loss of position and continued pressure from Baku.
TRIPP: From infrastructure to “colonisation”
The TRIPP project and the future of transport links through southern Armenia occupied an important place in Russian messaging during the period under review. Initially, they were presented as a threat to the regional geopolitical balance, then as a potential space for US military and intelligence infrastructure, and as a mechanism for increasing the influence of Azerbaijan and Turkey. In subsequent messaging, the transport project was increasingly framed in security terms. Infrastructure and economic risks began to be linked to the possibility of losing control over strategic routes, the growth of Turkey’s economic presence, and the erosion of Armenia’s effective sovereignty. By the end of the month, the frame of “colonisation” had appeared explicitly. TRIPP thus became one of the clearest examples of the narrative escalation observed in September. The project was moved out of the economic and infrastructure category and transformed into a symbol of geopolitical subordination and loss of control over the state.
Delegitimisation of Pashinyan and the autonomy of public debate
Across the month as a whole, there was a visible shift from criticism of individual government decisions towards the personalisation of responsibility around Nikol Pashinyan. The Armenian Prime Minister was portrayed as the principal actor responsible for the country’s strategic distancing from Russia, a politician willing to make concessions to Azerbaijan, in conflict with the Armenian Apostolic Church, and leading the state in a direction whose consequences he was unable to control. This made it possible to combine developments concerning foreign policy, security, the peace process, and internal conflicts into a single image of crisis attributed to the decisions of a specific leader.
In the second half of the month, a similar logic was applied to Armenia’s public debate. Highlighting information about US funding of media outlets, journalists, and bloggers served to undermine the autonomous nature of pro-Western positions. The mere fact of foreign funding was presented as grounds for questioning the independence of its recipients, without the need to address the substance of their arguments or their editorial activities. As a result, delegitimisation extended not only to Pashinyan himself and his policies, but also to part of the environment participating in the debate over Armenia’s strategic orientation. A pro-Western position could be portrayed as the product of external influence and dependency, thereby calling its autonomous character into question. Such a frame narrows the space for debate and shifts the assessment of a political opponent from a dispute over the direction of state policy to the level of their alleged links with external actors.
The Church as an arena of identity conflict
The conflict between the authorities and the Armenian Apostolic Church was among the most emotionally charged themes in September messaging. Russian and pro-Russian sources reinforced the interpretation of the government’s actions as interference in the Church’s autonomy and as an attack on one of the institutions symbolising Armenia’s historical and cultural continuity. This made it possible to shift the dispute from the level of current politics to the level of religion, history, and the moral legitimacy of the authorities. Criticism of specific actions by the Pashinyan administration was thus broadened to include the suggestion that the government was weakening not only a particular institutional environment, but also one of the fundamental points of reference of Armenian identity.
Towards the end of the month, the language of the messaging became further radicalised. The authorities’ actions were portrayed as an unprecedented campaign against the freedom of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Incorporating this conflict into the broader geopolitical narrative extended the image of Armenia’s strategic reorientation beyond foreign policy and security, encompassing also the sphere of the state’s symbolic foundations.
Russia as a difficult-to-replace partner and, at the same time, an offer
September messaging combined an emphasis on the risks associated with reducing relations with Moscow with the construction of an image of Russia as a state possessing resources, technologies, and an existing infrastructure of cooperation capable of offering Armenia tangible benefits. The importance of the Russian market, military potential, preferential energy terms, cooperation within Eurasian structures, and educational, linguistic, and cultural projects was highlighted. These were contrasted with the benefits of diversification, which were presented as more distant and uncertain, thereby reinforcing the image of existing relations with Russia as accessible, proven, and difficult to replace quickly.
A particularly clear example at the end of the month was the information concerning talks with Rosatom on the future of Armenia’s nuclear energy sector. In this case, Russia was presented as a provider of strategic technologies and expertise whose replacement would require time, new investment, and the development of an alternative technological base. This case formed part of a broader pattern in the portrayal of relations with Moscow, in which raising the perceived cost of alternatives was accompanied by an emphasis on the benefits of maintaining existing ties. Russia thus functioned as a partner that would be difficult and costly to replace, even with an awareness of the problems and constraints associated with that relationship.
Conclusion:
Narrowing the scope of strategic choice
September monitoring indicates that the main mechanism of Russian influence targeting Armenia was the asymmetric presentation of risk. Problems arising from the existing relationship with Moscow were portrayed as known and manageable, while alternative policy directions were presented as carrying costs that were more difficult to predict and potentially more dangerous. The strength of this messaging lay in its ability to adapt to a changing agenda. New developments could be incorporated into already established frames concerning security, the economy, sovereignty, identity, or external subordination. This made it possible to preserve continuity of messaging despite shifts in subject matter and to connect events of very different kinds within a similar interpretation of Armenia’s strategic choices.
The most important qualitative shift occurred towards the end of the month. Earlier warnings about the costs of distancing from Russia were partially replaced by messaging according to which the process of losing control and becoming subordinated to the interests of the West and Turkey had already begun. Within this logic, reversing that process was presented as a necessity. A potential effect of this configuration is an increase in the political and social cost of strategic change and the reinforcement of the perception that the available alternatives do not offer Armenia an equally secure path towards reducing its dependence on Moscow.
Annex
Catalogue of Identified Narratives and Persuasive Frames
1. “Armenia must choose: Russia or the West”
Russian messaging portrayed Armenia’s foreign policy as a choice between two mutually exclusive directions: maintaining strategic relations with Russia or entering Western structures. Such framing narrowed the space for a multi-vector policy and presented the development of relations with the European Union and the United States as a process leading to the gradual abandonment of Armenia’s existing ties with Moscow.
Mechanism: reducing a complex field of decisions to a binary alternative. Diversification ceased to be presented as a means of increasing Armenia’s autonomy and instead began to function as taking one side in a geopolitical conflict. In this way, the range of conceivable and politically “safe” options was narrowed.
Potential effect: weakening social acceptance for a more autonomous Armenian policy. An attempt to pursue a more multi-vector policy may then be perceived as strategically unrealistic, excessively risky, or requiring Armenia to align itself fully against Moscow.
2. “You may choose Europe, but you will pay for that choice”
European integration was presented as a direction whose costs would be directly felt by Armenian society and the economy through higher energy prices, export difficulties, transport problems, and reduced preferential access to the Russian market.
Mechanism: loss aversion. The potential long-term benefits of diversification remained in the background, while attention was focused on losses that could be felt in the short term. In this way, an abstract geopolitical choice was translated into issues of income, prices, trade, and everyday economic security.
Potential effect: increasing the social cost of supporting a change in strategic orientation. The recipient does not need to regard European integration as the wrong solution; it is sufficient for them to begin perceiving it as a decision carrying direct and difficult-to-assess economic risks.
3. “The European Union makes promises, Russia provides tangible benefits”
Russian messaging constructed an asymmetric comparison between cooperation with the European Union and existing relations with Russia. The benefits associated with European integration were presented as future, conditional, and uncertain, while the Russian market, energy supplies, economic preferences, and existing infrastructure of cooperation were portrayed as resources already available and capable of being used directly.
Mechanism: juxtaposing different time horizons. The costs and benefits associated with long-term structural change were compared with the effects of already existing economic ties, without clearly distinguishing between current dependency and the potential consequences of gradually reducing it. As a result, the Russian presence was portrayed as concrete and predictable, while the European offer was presented as distant, conditional, and requiring time.
Potential effect: reinforcing the perception that maintaining existing relations with Russia entails less risk than investing in alternatives whose benefits remain deferred over time. This does not necessarily have to lead to increased support for Russia; it may, however, increase scepticism towards European integration and weaken willingness to bear the short-term costs of diversification.
4. “Europe is not waiting for Armenia”
Russian messaging challenged the assumption that Armenia could secure a meaningful and lasting place within European political and economic structures. Geographic, economic, and political barriers were emphasised, while the European market was portrayed as difficult, competitive, and poorly aligned with Armenian interests.
Mechanism: separating the costs and benefits of strategic reorientation. The costs of reducing relations with Russia were presented as concrete and immediate, while the potential benefits of European integration were portrayed as distant, uncertain, and lacking guarantees. As a result, Armenia was depicted as a state that could lose the existing benefits of cooperation with Russia without gaining a comparable position within the Western system in return.
Potential effect: reducing the attractiveness of the European direction by reinforcing a sense of strategic isolation. Armenia may be perceived as a state bearing the costs of distancing itself from Russia while simultaneously lacking certainty of full acceptance by the West. Such a frame supports the perception that maintaining existing ties is safer than pursuing change without guarantees of obtaining an equivalent alternative.
5. “Without Russia, Armenia will be defenceless”
Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri was presented not as one element of Armenia’s security system, but as the fundamental guarantee of the state’s protection. Reducing or ending the Russian military presence was associated with the emergence of a security vacuum and increased Armenian vulnerability to pressure from Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Mechanism: shifting the debate from assessing the effectiveness of existing Russian security guarantees to the risks associated with losing them. The focus was placed on the possible consequences of reducing Russia’s military presence. Even guarantees assessed critically or regarded as imperfect could therefore gain an advantage over solutions portrayed as uncertain and insufficiently tested.
Potential effect: increasing aversion to reforming the security system and weakening willingness to seek alternative guarantees. Within this construct, the presence of Russian troops itself begins to function as an argument for preserving the existing security model.
6. “If the Russians leave, the Turks will come”
In the middle of the month, the narrative concerning the Russian military presence became strongly linked to the Turkish threat. Russia was portrayed as a barrier limiting the expansion of Ankara’s influence, while a reduction of the Russian presence was presented as a factor opening space for Turkish political, economic, and strategic pressure.
Mechanism: localisation of the broader security narrative through reference to historical and identity-related factors deeply rooted in Armenia. The reduction of Russian influence was linked to a specific image of threat from Turkey. This gave the message greater emotional weight and made it more difficult to portray a reduction of the Russian presence simply as an increase in Armenia’s sovereignty.
Potential effect: reinforcing the perception that weakening Russia’s position automatically strengthens Turkey’s. As a consequence, the Russian presence may be perceived not as one of several possible security instruments, but as a necessary counterweight to the Turkish threat.
7. “The West is handing Armenia over to the Turkish sphere of influence”
Russian messaging developed the claim that Armenia’s rapprochement with Western countries does not lead to greater autonomy, but may instead result in its subordination to the interests of Turkey as a regional NATO member. Within this construct, the West was not portrayed as an independent partner of Armenia, but as a channel enabling the growth of Ankara’s influence in the South Caucasus.
Mechanism: localisation of an abstract narrative of Western subordination through reference to Turkey, which is far more deeply embedded in Armenian historical memory and threat perceptions. NATO and cooperation with the West were thus interpreted through the prism of Ankara, giving the geopolitical message a more emotional and locally recognisable character.
Potential effect: extending the reach of the narrative to audiences that do not necessarily hold pro-Russian views but remain distrustful of Turkey. Cooperation with the West may then be perceived not as a tool for increasing Armenia’s autonomy, but as a process opening the way to a new dependency, this time on Ankara.
8. “The West needs Armenia solely against Russia”
One of the most frequently recurring lines of messaging portrayed the interest of the United States and the European Union in Armenia as entirely instrumental. In this framing, Armenia was not treated as an autonomous partner, but as a tool for limiting Russian influence and, in a broader perspective, for exerting influence on Iran and China as well.
Mechanism: undermining the motives behind Western engagement. Political, economic, and military cooperation was embedded within a broader geopolitical rivalry, with Armenia assigned the role of an instrument used by other actors. Developing relations with new partners could thus be presented as yet another form of external dependency.
Potential effect: weakening trust in the Western offer of cooperation and reinforcing the perception that a change in geopolitical orientation will not increase Armenia’s autonomy. Within this frame, the debate over greater autonomy is reduced to a choice between different sources of dependency.
9. “Armenia is becoming an anti-Russian foothold”
As Armenia’s contacts with Western countries developed, Russian messaging increasingly portrayed its territory as a potential platform for activities directed against the Russian Federation. Military, political, informational, and infrastructure cooperation were combined into a single image of a growing Western and NATO presence in the South Caucasus.
Mechanism: presenting different forms of cooperation as elements of a common process threatening Armenia’s security and strategic autonomy. Activities differing in nature and scale were combined into an image of Armenia’s gradual transformation from an autonomous participant in international relations into a strategic foothold used by the West against Moscow. Within this construct, the reduction of Russian influence was presented as part of an external strategy of confrontation with Russia.
Potential effect: undermining the legitimacy of Armenia’s strategic diversification and increasing the political cost of cooperation with the West. If every new initiative can be presented as evidence of the construction of an “anti-Russian foothold”, even measures intended to increase the state’s autonomy may be interpreted as the subordination of Armenia to a foreign geopolitical agenda.
10. “NATO is taking over the Armenian army”
Procedural changes, training cooperation, and the adaptation of selected military standards were presented as successive stages in the subordination of the Armenian armed forces to NATO structures. Even symbolic elements of military ceremonial practice were given strategic significance and used as evidence of the progressing “NATO-isation” of the armed forces.
Mechanism: extending the significance of limited technical and organisational changes to the entire state security system. Decisions concerning standards, training, or procedures were elevated to the status of symptoms of a broader process leading to the gradual erosion of the autonomy of the Armenian armed forces.
Potential effect: reinforcing the perception that a loss of control over the armed forces may progress even before any formal change in alliance alignment. Within this frame, military cooperation with the West acquires the meaning of the first stage of institutional subordination to external structures.
11. “American security guarantees are illusory”
Russian messaging consistently challenged the ability of the United States to provide Armenia with lasting and credible security. Western assistance was presented as costly, conditional, and potentially temporary, while Russian guarantees were associated with an existing military presence, infrastructure, and Russia’s geographical embeddedness in the regional security system.
Mechanism: an asymmetric comparison between existing Russian resources and the future and conditional capabilities of the West. There was no need to demonstrate that Russian guarantees were effective or sufficient; it was enough to reinforce the perception that the American alternative remained less certain, more costly, and dependent on decisions taken outside Armenia.
Potential effect: increasing uncertainty surrounding the diversification of the security system and weakening willingness to bear the costs of restructuring it. As a result, even an imperfect Russian presence may be perceived as a more predictable solution than Western guarantees whose durability and effectiveness are portrayed as uncertain.
12. “Ukraine shows how rapprochement with the West ends”
Ukraine was used as the most important negative reference scenario for Armenia. Russian messaging constructed a sequence in which rapprochement with the West leads to deeper military cooperation, the weakening of relations with Russia, the use of the state in a broader geopolitical confrontation, and ultimately to a conflict whose principal costs are borne by the state itself.
Mechanism: transferring images of war, destruction, and loss of security associated with Ukraine onto Armenia’s strategic decisions, without the need to demonstrate the actual comparability of the two cases. Cooperation with the West could therefore be assessed not through the prism of its specific conditions and benefits, but through association with the most dramatic possible outcome.
Potential effect: increasing aversion to strategic change by linking it to the risk of war. The recipient does not need to regard the situations of Armenia and Ukraine as genuinely comparable; it is sufficient for deeper cooperation with the West to begin to be perceived as the first stage of a path leading towards a similar conflict.
13. “Pashinyan is becoming the Armenian Zelensky”
Towards the end of the month, the negative Ukrainian scenario was applied directly to Nikol Pashinyan. This label linked Pashinyan to the previously established image of a leader subordinated to the West, deepening conflict with Russia, and leading the state towards confrontation.
Mechanism: narrative condensation. A single label replaced extensive argumentation and transferred onto Pashinyan a ready-made package of meanings previously associated with Ukraine and its leadership. This allowed individual decisions by the Armenian Prime Minister to be interpreted as elements of an already familiar scenario, without the need to assess them separately.
Potential effect: personalisation of geopolitical risk and the transfer of responsibility for possible future crises onto a single individual. Within this construct, Pashinyan ceases to function as a politician making controversial decisions and begins to function as a symbol of a path that, according to the Russian narrative, may lead Armenia to repeat the “Ukrainian scenario”.
14. “Pashinyan is leading Armenia towards war, not peace”
The process of normalising relations with Azerbaijan was presented in Russian and pro-Russian messaging not as a means of reducing the risk of conflict, but as a source of future danger. Government actions described as compromises or elements of peace negotiations were reinterpreted as unilateral concessions intended to weaken Armenia’s position and increase the scope for further pressure from Baku.
Mechanism: reversal of the government’s stated policy logic. Actions justified by the government as necessary for stabilisation were portrayed as potential sources of future destabilisation. Compromises and peace negotiations could therefore be interpreted as decisions increasing the risk of further pressure from Azerbaijan.
Potential effect: weakening public confidence in the peace process and concentrating responsibility for future threats around the Armenian Prime Minister. Within this frame, the policy of normalisation acquires the meaning of a process that may weaken Armenia’s position and create greater scope for further demands from Baku.
15. “Peace with Azerbaijan means capitulation”
Peace negotiations with Azerbaijan were presented as a process of unilateral Armenian concessions rather than as an attempt to resolve the conflict and reduce the risk of further escalation. Issues concerning Tigranashen, Armenian prisoners, Nagorno-Karabakh, border delimitation, and transport links were combined into a single interpretative sequence in which every compromise became further evidence of the weakening of Armenia’s position.
Mechanism: assigning a common meaning to different elements of the negotiation process: one concession leads to another, compromise leads to loss of control, and peace leads to gradual capitulation. Within this frame, individual decisions are not assessed on the basis of their specific costs and benefits, but are incorporated into a broader scenario of the progressive loss of Armenia’s position vis-à-vis Baku.
Potential effect: weakening the social legitimacy of the peace process. Even solutions that bring Armenia specific benefits may be portrayed as another stage of capitulation if the dominant criterion of assessment becomes the assumption that every compromise with Azerbaijan leads to further demands and losses.
16. “TRIPP is a tool of American interference”
The TRIPP project was presented as an instrument enabling the United States to establish a lasting presence in the strategic space of the South Caucasus. The messaging highlighted the possibility of US military or intelligence infrastructure being introduced and of the regional geopolitical balance being altered.
Mechanism: shifting the assessment of the project from transport and economic issues towards security and geopolitical rivalry. The messaging emphasised the possibility of a military presence, intelligence activity, and the long-term strategic entrenchment of the United States in the region. TRIPP was thereby presented as part of a broader shift in the balance of power in the South Caucasus.
Potential effect: increasing public distrust of the project by linking it to a loss of control over Armenia’s security and foreign policy. Within this construct, even elements of an economic nature may be interpreted as a cover for the lasting expansion of the US strategic presence.
17. “TRIPP means losing control over Armenia’s strategic routes”
At a later stage of the messaging, the TRIPP project was portrayed as a mechanism that could lead to the subordination of parts of Armenian infrastructure to the interests of Azerbaijan and other external actors. In this narrative, the formal preservation of territorial sovereignty was contrasted with the possibility of a de facto loss of control over strategic routes and the manner in which they are used.
Mechanism: separating formal sovereignty from practical control. Even if Armenia retained legal authority over its own territory, the project was portrayed as leading to a situation in which key decisions concerning infrastructure, transport, and flows would depend on the interests of external actors. In this way, an infrastructure compromise was reinterpreted as a concealed form of erosion of statehood.
Potential effect: reinforcing the perception that concessions concerning the rules governing transport links may lead to the gradual loss of effective control over the state’s strategic assets. TRIPP then ceases to be perceived as a project requiring negotiation of conditions and safeguards and begins to function as a symbol of the restriction of Armenia’s sovereignty.
18. “TRIPP will open Armenia to Turkish economic expansion”
Towards the end of the month, the Turkish threat was presented not only in terms of military security, but also in relation to the economy, trade, infrastructure, and ownership. The TRIPP project was described as a potential channel for increasing Turkey’s economic presence in Armenia, with Russian commentators referring to examples from other countries in the region.
Mechanism: transferring existing historical and identity-related concerns into the sphere of everyday economic security. The threat associated with Turkey was extended to issues concerning the labour market, businesses, infrastructure, ownership, and economic dependency. This gave the transport project a significance extending beyond its infrastructure function.
Potential effect: extending distrust towards TRIPP into the sphere of the economic interests of citizens and local businesses. The project may be perceived as a channel for increasing Turkey’s economic presence and gradually deepening Armenia’s dependence on Ankara.
19. “TRIPP is a form of colonisation of Armenia”
The most radical stage of the narrative concerning TRIPP involved describing the project as a form of Armenia’s “colonisation”. In this framing, the transport project ceased to be presented as an infrastructure undertaking carrying specific risks and instead began to function as a symbol of the lasting subordination of the state’s strategic assets to external interests.
Mechanism: semantic escalation. Successive stages of the messaging shifted the interpretation of TRIPP from an economic and geopolitical issue, through the risk of losing control over infrastructure and growing external influence, to the category of “colonisation”. The use of this term radicalised the assessment of the project because it suggested not an isolated risk or an unfavourable configuration of interests, but a systemic and long-term process of losing sovereignty.
Potential effect: narrowing the space for assessing the project in terms of costs, benefits, and possible safeguards. If TRIPP is equated with “colonisation”, opposition to the project may be presented as a defence of statehood, while support for it may be portrayed as acceptance of external subordination.
20. “The European Union is using visa blackmail against Armenia”
Information concerning possible conditions for visa liberalisation was used to construct an image of the European Union as an actor pressuring Armenia to restrict its contacts with Russia. In successive messages, the possibility that certain conditions might be introduced was presented with increasing certainty, until it began to function as a narrative of “visa blackmail” and a demand to restrict the entry of Russian citizens.
Mechanism: amplification combined with a change in the status of information. Uncertain information originating from a local source was repeatedly reproduced by successive channels, while caveats concerning its reliability and degree of confirmation gradually disappeared. As a result, a hypothesis or report requiring further verification could begin to function as an established fact. From a FIMI perspective, the key issue here is not the critical position towards the European Union itself, but the transition from an uncertain report to a claim presented as confirmed.
Potential effect: reinforcing the perception that European integration requires Armenia to first restrict its existing social and political relations with Russia, without any guarantee of obtaining concrete benefits in return. The European Union may then be perceived not as a partner offering greater mobility, but as an actor making that benefit conditional on the gradual restriction of existing ties with Moscow.
21. “The West wants to cut Armenians off from Russians”
The narrative concerning visa liberalisation was gradually expanded from the administrative level to the social and identity-related sphere. Possible restrictions on the movement of Russian citizens were presented not only as a political condition, but also as an attempt to limit contacts between Armenian and Russian societies.
Mechanism: transforming a regulatory issue into a narrative about severing interpersonal and cultural ties. Europeanisation was linked to restrictions on social, linguistic, and cultural contacts between Armenia and Russia. The administrative issue thus acquired a dimension relating to everyday relations and a sense of communal closeness.
Potential effect: increasing the emotional cost of European integration. Within this frame, a change in foreign policy orientation may become associated with restrictions on family contacts, mobility, and social and cultural ties with Russia.
22. “Russia will not finance Armenia’s integration with Europe”
Russian economic messaging also contained a clear disciplining component. The continuation of existing economic preferences, market access, and favourable terms of cooperation was presented as dependent on the nature of Armenia’s political relations with Moscow. Economic security was thus directly linked to the geopolitical choices of the authorities in Yerevan.
Mechanism: shifting responsibility for any potential deterioration in economic conditions from Russia to Armenia. Possible restrictions, the loss of preferences, or rising costs were portrayed as foreseeable consequences of a change in Armenia’s direction of integration. Within this logic, the possibility of applying economic pressure acquired the character of a consequence of Yerevan’s decisions rather than a separate action by Moscow.
Potential effect: increasing the political cost of strategic diversification. A deterioration in economic conditions may be perceived as the price of the choice made by the Armenian authorities, thereby partially shifting responsibility for the consequences of possible Russian restrictions onto Armenia.
23. “Russian gas is proof of the tangible value of relations with Moscow”
Energy was one of the most concrete elements of Russian economic messaging. Rather than conducting an abstract discussion about geopolitical orientation or alliance systems, the communication focused attention on the direct relationship between ties with Russia, energy prices, and the condition of the Armenian economy.
Mechanism: materialisation of the geopolitical choice. Russian gas was presented as a tangible benefit available immediately, while alternative directions of cooperation were associated with the risk of higher costs and uncertainty regarding future conditions. As a result, energy dependency ceased to be presented as a strategic constraint and began to function as evidence of the practical value of relations with Moscow.
Potential effect: increasing public caution towards attempts to reduce the Russian presence in the energy sector. Existing dependency may then be perceived not as a problem requiring diversification, but as a mechanism providing stability and predictability, the disruption of which could generate direct costs for households and the economy as a whole.
24. “Armenia is losing energy sovereignty under the banner of diversification”
Russian messaging reversed the meaning of the concept of energy diversification. Modernisation projects, the green transition, and the development of new regional connections were presented not as measures increasing the resilience of the energy system, but as processes that could lead to Armenia becoming dependent on new suppliers, technologies, and external interests.
Mechanism: redefining energy sovereignty. Maintaining the Russian presence in the sector was presented as a source of stability and control, while diversification was portrayed as a process that could create new and less predictable dependencies. In this way, changes in the structure of supply and technology were linked to the risk of losing control over the energy sector.
Potential effect: reducing the social and political attractiveness of diversification projects. New supply directions and forms of technological cooperation may be perceived as sources of additional dependencies whose costs and consequences are more difficult to predict than those associated with the existing model.
25. “Russia remains an irreplaceable technological partner”
A positive component of Russian messaging was the emphasis on Russia’s ability to offer Armenia advanced technologies, infrastructure, and participation in projects of strategic importance. Nuclear energy and Rosatom’s offer occupied a particularly prominent place and were used to portray Russian-Armenian cooperation as rooted in areas that would be difficult to replace quickly through cooperation with other partners.
Mechanism: shifting the discussion from political declarations to existing expertise, infrastructure, and technological capabilities. Russia was presented not only as a political partner, but also as a provider of solutions important for the functioning of the state’s strategic sectors. Within this framing, a change in political orientation does not automatically imply the ability to rapidly replace Russian technologies and know-how.
Potential effect: reinforcing the perception that Armenia’s room for manoeuvre remains constrained by existing technological and infrastructure dependencies. Even as cooperation with other partners deepens, Russia may continue to be perceived as an actor whose role in key sectors will remain difficult to replace in the short and medium term.
26. “Russia is resilient, strong, and will withstand Western pressure”
Russian messaging consistently portrayed the Russian Federation as a state capable of absorbing the effects of sanctions, adapting its economy to new conditions, and developing alternative trade and political relations. The image of Russia as an actor resilient to external pressure constituted an important backdrop to messaging directed at Armenian audiences.
Mechanism: challenging the calculation that strategic distancing from Moscow may be rational because of Russia’s anticipated weakening. If the Russian Federation is portrayed as a state capable of functioning over the long term despite Western pressure, reducing relations with it can be presented as a decision based on an incorrect assessment of the future balance of power.
Potential effect: increasing the political cost of strategic distancing from Moscow. Maintaining close relations with Russia can then be presented not as alignment with a state losing significance, but as preserving ties with a durable and resilient actor capable of maintaining its position despite Western pressure.
27. “Pashinyan is acting against Armenia’s natural interests”
The delegitimisation of Nikol Pashinyan was based on portraying his policies not as one of several possible strategies for the country’s development, but as actions contrary to Armenia’s fundamental interests. Decisions concerning relations with Russia, European integration, reform of the armed forces, the peace process, and the conflict with the Church were combined into a single image of a leader systematically weakening the pillars of the state’s security, sovereignty, and identity.
Mechanism: personalisation and the linking of separate political disputes around a single figure. Decisions concerning security, relations with Russia, the peace process, or the conflict with the Church were presented as elements of a single political direction attributed to Pashinyan. This made it possible to associate future threats and crises with his actions as well.
Potential effect: shifting the debate from the assessment of specific policies to the assessment of the Prime Minister himself as a source of strategic risk. Within this frame, Pashinyan may function as the central figure held responsible for the consequences attributed to Armenia’s reorientation.
28. “The authorities are destroying the foundations of Armenian statehood”
Criticism of individual government decisions was reinforced by a broader message concerning the gradual dismantling of the institutional and symbolic foundations of the state. Foreign policy, internal reforms, relations with the Church, and disputes over historical memory were presented as elements of a single process leading to the weakening of Armenia’s security, continuity, and identity.
Mechanism: combining separate political disputes into a single image of a threat to the state. Different decisions and conflicts were assigned a common meaning and presented as successive elements of a process weakening the foundations of Armenian statehood. Current political criticism was thereby expanded into a broader message concerning the gradual weakening of the state’s institutions, security, and identity.
Potential effect: increasing the mobilising and emotional character of the messaging. The dispute ceases to concern the effectiveness of specific reforms or government decisions and begins to be interpreted as a conflict over the survival of the state, its institutions, and its identity. Within this frame, the political opponent is no longer portrayed merely as the author of misguided policies, but as a participant in a process threatening the foundations of Armenian statehood.
29. “The authorities are attacking the Armenian Apostolic Church”
The conflict surrounding the Armenian Apostolic Church was presented as unprecedented state interference in the autonomy of one of Armenia’s most important religious and symbolic institutions. The authorities’ actions were portrayed as an attack on an institution identified with the historical continuity of the state and the national community, giving the current political dispute a much broader identity-related dimension.
Mechanism: accumulating voices supporting the same interpretation. Statements by clergy, lawyers, opposition representatives, and foreign critics were juxtaposed in a manner that reinforced the impression of broad support for the claim that the authorities were attacking the Church. The diversity of sources gave this interpretation the appearance of multi-source confirmation.
Potential effect: increasing the polarising character of the dispute. Criticism of the government’s actions is shifted to the level of religion, history, and the continuity of the national community, meaning that the conflict may be perceived as a threat to one of the fundamental elements of Armenian identity.
30. “Russia defends traditional Armenian identity”
Support provided to the Armenian Apostolic Church by Russian religious institutions and media made it possible to construct an image of Russia as an external defender of Armenian tradition in its dispute with the country’s own authorities. The conflict surrounding the Church was thus incorporated into a broader narrative about the protection of religion, historical continuity, and traditional elements of national identity.
Mechanism: shifting Russian influence from the geopolitical sphere into the domains of religion, values, and identity. Russia was portrayed as an ally of an institution symbolising national continuity and opposing actions by the authorities regarded as a threat to the traditional order. Such a frame shifted attention away from Russian interests in Armenia towards Moscow’s declared role as a defender of Armenian tradition and identity.
Potential effect: providing the Russian presence with additional legitimacy extending beyond security, economic, and foreign policy considerations. Relations with Russia may then be presented as an element of protecting Armenian identity, while strategic distancing from Moscow may be portrayed as a process weakening not only existing political ties, but also shared cultural and religious foundations.
31. “Armenian media and civil society are funded by the West”
Information about US and, more broadly, Western funding of media outlets, journalists, bloggers, and civil society organisations was used to question the autonomy of parts of Armenia’s public debate. The mere presence of foreign funding was presented as grounds for questioning the autonomous nature of pro-Western positions and suggesting their dependence on external financing.
Mechanism: shifting attention from the content of the message to the status of its source. The funding sources of media outlets, experts, and civil society organisations were used to question their credibility and autonomy. This allowed the assessment of arguments to be replaced by an assessment of financial ties and presumed external interests.
Potential effect: weakening trust in parts of the media and civil society environment and limiting their ability to participate in public debate as autonomous actors. Within this frame, a pro-Western position may be interpreted as the result of external influence, making it easier to delegitimise entire groups without addressing the substance of their arguments.
32. “Pro-Russian actors are being repressed by the authorities”
Court proceedings, arrests, and other actions by state authorities against politicians and groups perceived as favourable towards Russia were presented as evidence of political repression. In the messaging, their significance was shifted from the level of specific allegations, procedures, and legal disputes to the level of a geopolitical confrontation between the authorities and actors associated with maintaining close relations with Moscow.
Mechanism: assigning a common political interpretation to separate legal actions. Proceedings involving specific individuals were combined into an image of a broader campaign aimed at limiting Russian influence in Armenia. Those subjected to such measures could thereby be portrayed as being repressed primarily because of their political or geopolitical orientation.
Potential effect: strengthening the position of these actors as victims of repression and increasing the social legitimacy of some pro-Russian groups. Within this frame, individual legal cases may be incorporated into a broader narrative of conflict between the authorities and an entire political current, blurring the distinction between the legal assessment of specific cases and their geopolitical interpretation.
33. “Contacts with Poland are evidence of Armenia’s Euro-Atlantic reorientation”
Armenia’s contacts with Poland were presented as one of the signals of Yerevan’s gradual shift towards the Western political and security system. Poland was portrayed in this context as a NATO member state and as a channel through which Western military, parliamentary, and informational influence could reach Armenia.
Mechanism: attributing to bilateral contacts a significance extending beyond their direct substance. Meetings, institutional cooperation, and political contacts were incorporated into a broader narrative of Armenia’s Euro-Atlantic reorientation. Within this messaging, Poland served as an additional element reinforcing the claim that Armenia was gradually distancing itself from Russia.
Potential effect: limiting the possibility of perceiving Armenian-Polish relations as an autonomous direction of Armenia’s foreign policy. Contacts with Warsaw may then be interpreted primarily through the prism of Russia–West rivalry rather than through their own bilateral agenda.
34. “Armenia is betraying its own history and natural alliances”
In the most radical messaging, Armenia’s changing political orientation was portrayed as a rupture with its own history and existing commitments. Relations with Russia were associated with concepts of loyalty, historical memory, and political continuity, while the weakening of these ties was presented as a rejection of part of Armenia’s own heritage.
Mechanism: moralisation of geopolitical choice. The debate over the effectiveness of particular alliances and foreign policy directions was shifted to the level of loyalty, betrayal, and historical fidelity. A change in relations with Russia could thereby be portrayed as a departure from an established order and a violation of Armenia’s “natural” ties.
Potential effect: narrowing the space for pragmatic debate over the balance of alliances. Assessment of a policy direction begins to be linked to the moral classification of its supporters and opponents, making it more difficult to analyse decisions solely through the prism of the state’s interests.
35. “Armenia is already being taken over by the West and Turkey”
Towards the end of September, parts of Russian messaging showed a shift from warning about the possible subordination of Armenia to external interests towards presenting this process as already underway. The development of relations with the West, military cooperation, the TRIPP project, normalisation of relations with Turkey, and negotiations with Azerbaijan were combined into an image of Armenia’s gradual loss of strategic autonomy.
Mechanism: shifting the threat from the future into the present. Earlier warnings about a possible loss of sovereignty gave way to claims that the process of Armenia’s subordination was already underway. Different political actions could thereby be combined into an image of a single, advancing process of external “takeover” of the state.
Potential effect: creating conditions for portraying Russian pressure or the restoration of Russian influence as a response to prior interference by the West and Turkey. Within this frame, Russian actions may acquire the character of a defensive response to a process presented as the already ongoing subordination of Armenia to other actors.
6. “Armenia’s return to the Russian sphere of influence is a corrective measure”
The narrative of a Western “takeover” of Armenia created a basis for portraying the restoration of Russian influence as a process of re-establishing the previous balance and the “natural” strategic order. Within this framing, renewed strengthening of Russia’s position was presented as a means of reversing the effects of Armenia’s earlier subordination to the West and Turkey and restoring the previous strategic balance.
Mechanism: reversal of the meaning of interference. Political, informational, or economic pressure from Moscow was framed as action intended to help Armenia regain security and autonomy. Strengthening Russia’s position could thereby be presented as restoring the previous strategic balance.
Potential effect: increasing the legitimacy of more active Russian influence operations. The prior portrayal of the Western presence as a form of takeover of Armenia makes it possible to interpret the restoration of Russia’s position as a defensive or corrective response to the state’s external subordination.
37. “Russia may be a difficult partner, but it is an indispensable one”
September messaging did not require Russia to be portrayed as an unproblematic partner or as an actor consistently operating in Armenia’s interests. Much more frequently, it sought to reinforce the perception that, despite existing tensions and costs, relations with Moscow remain too deeply embedded in the spheres of security, the economy, energy, technology, and social ties to be replaced quickly.
Mechanism: changing the criterion by which relations with Russia are assessed. The focus was shifted from the question of the quality of relations with Moscow to whether other available directions could provide a comparable level of security, predictability, and material benefits. Within this framing, the weaknesses of relations with Russia could be presented as known and manageable, while the costs of strategic change were portrayed as greater and more difficult to assess.
Potential effect: reinforcing the perception that strategic distancing from Russia is too risky even where social trust in or sympathy towards Moscow remains limited. Russia does not need to be perceived as a desirable partner in order to continue functioning as one regarded as difficult to replace.
38. “Any direction other than Russia is more risky”
The overarching line connecting a significant part of the September messaging was the portrayal of policy directions other than the existing relationship with Russia as carrying greater risks than maintaining the current model of dependency. The European Union was associated with economic uncertainty, the United States with uncertainty over security guarantees, NATO with the risk of escalation and conflict, Turkey with expansion, Azerbaijan with further pressure, and the peace process with additional concessions.
Mechanism: systematic reduction of the attractiveness of competing strategic directions. Different types of threats were attributed to individual policy options, while existing relations with Moscow were presented as familiar, deeply rooted, and more predictable. Armenia’s strategic choice was thereby reduced to a comparison of the levels of risk assigned to the various directions.
Potential effect: narrowing the perceived range of safe strategic choices. Within this frame, maintaining relations with Russia may gain an advantage by presenting the remaining options as more uncertain, costly, or dangerous. Acceptance of such a choice may result from the perception that other available directions involve greater risk.
Analytical Assessment
The best-documented cases are those in which it is possible to trace how a message changed in the course of further distribution. In the visa narrative, a process of amplification is visible in which caveats concerning the reliability of the original information gradually disappeared. In the case of TRIPP, it is possible to observe a change in the way the project was presented. Initially, it was described as an infrastructure undertaking, then linked to control and external influence, and ultimately portrayed as a threat to Armenia’s security and sovereignty. The monitoring therefore makes it possible to reconstruct with relative precision the sources of some of the messaging, its subsequent dissemination, and the changes occurring along the way. It is considerably more difficult, on this basis, to determine whether individual participants in this circulation acted in a directly coordinated manner. The recurrence of narratives, similarity of messaging, and mutual amplification do not in themselves constitute evidence that local actors were tasked by Russian structures. They do, however, make it possible to identify where the messaging originated, through which channels it was disseminated, where its character changed, and how similar content subsequently appeared in both Russian and local information circulation.
The report does not directly measure the impact of the observed narratives on public attitudes. It does, however, make it possible to identify their persistence, recurrence, directions of amplification, and the mechanisms used to increase the credibility and persuasive strength of the messaging. In subsequent monitoring cycles, particular importance will attach to further documenting complete transmission pathways, from the original source through Russian and local amplifiers to the subsequent reuse of content within the Russian information environment. This will make it possible to distinguish narrative convergence from coordination more accurately and to identify more precisely cases that meet the criteria for FIMI.
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